"The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), decided on October 24, 2012, to continue purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month. The Committee released a statement after the meeting saying that it expects a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy to remain appropriate for a considerable period after the economic recovery strengthens, and that it currently anticipates that exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate are likely to be warranted at least through mid-2015. "I dissented for the same reasons that I did at the September meeting. I opposed continuing additional asset purchases. Further monetary stimulus now is unlikely to result in a discernible improvement in growth, but if it does, it’s also likely to cause an unwanted increase in inflation. Economic activity has been growing at a modest pace, on average, and inflation has been fluctuating around 2 percent, which the Committee has identified as its inflation goal. Unemployment does remain high by historical standards, but improvement in labor market conditions appears to have been held back by real impediments that are beyond the capacity of monetary policy to offset. In such circumstances, further monetary stimulus runs the risk of raising inflation in a way that threatens the stability of inflation expectations. "I also dissented because I disagreed with the characterization of the time period over which the stance of monetary policy would be highly accommodative and the federal funds rate would be exceptionally low. I read the Committee statement as saying that the federal funds rate will be exceptionally low for a considerable time after we observe a marked increase in the growth of employment and output. I do not believe that a policy conforming to this characterization would be appropriate, because it implies providing too much stimulus beyond the point at which rate increases will be required to keep inflation in check. Such an implied commitment would be inconsistent with a balanced approach to the FOMC’s price stability and maximum employment mandates. I do believe that it is useful for the Committee to characterize economic conditions under which policy would be likely to change in the future, but specific calendar dates are a highly imperfect way of doing so. “My views on the economy and monetary policy are also available on richmondfed.org.”